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LAFLER V. COOPER’S REMEDY: A WEAK RESPONSE TO 
A CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION 
Matthew T. Ciulla* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Sixth Amendment’s Counsel Clause preserves an accused’s right 
to counsel.1  The mere fact, however, that “a person who happens to be a 
lawyer is present at trial alongside the accused . . . is not enough to satisfy 
the constitutional command.”2  Rather, defendants have a right to the 
effective assistance of counsel.  This right is protected by Strickland v. 
Washington’s two-prong ineffective assistance of counsel test.3 
The United States Supreme Court recognizes that an accused enjoys 
this right before accepting a plea deal.4  Only recently, however, has the 
Supreme Court addressed the issue of effective assistance of counsel when 
an accused rejects (or, at least, does not accept) a plea deal, in the sister 
decisions of Lafler v. Cooper5 and Missouri v. Frye.6  While Frye 
addressed the situation in which defense counsel failed to inform the 
defendant of plea offers before they lapsed,7 the Court in Lafler turned its 
focus to counsel deficiently advising the defendant to reject a favorable 
plea deal.8 
In Lafler, defendant Anthony Cooper’s attorney informed him of a 
“favorable plea offer,” but deficiently advised him to reject it.9  Cooper 
pled not guilty, and received “a full and fair trial before a jury.”10  Cooper 
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 1  U.S. CONST. amend. VI.   
 2  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984).   
 3  See id. at 687–88 (holding that defendant making an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim must first “show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard 
of reasonableness”); id. at 694–95 (holding that defendant must also meet prejudice prong, 
showing “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different”).   
 4  See, e.g., McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (stating that 
defendants pleading guilty are still “entitled to the effective assistance of competent 
counsel”); id. at 771 n.14 (collecting cases); see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366 
(2010) (applying Strickland test to guilty pleas); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985) 
(“[T]he same [Strickland] two-part standard seems to us applicable to ineffective-assistance 
claims arising out of the plea process.”).   
 5  132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).   
 6  132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).   
 7  See id. at 1404–05.   
 8  See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1383–84.   
 9  Id. at 1383. 
 10  Id.  
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then “received a sentence harsher than that offered in the rejected plea 
bargain.”11  Taking as a given that Cooper’s “counsel’s advice with respect 
to the plea offer fell below the standard of adequate assistance of counsel 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment,”12 the Supreme Court set out to apply 
the familiar Strickland analysis to the situation in which “ineffective 
assistance results in a rejection of the plea offer and the defendant is 
convicted at the ensuing trial.”13  Finding that both of Strickland’s 
prongs—deficient performance and prejudice14—were met,15 the Court 
crafted a novel remedy: the State was ordered to “reoffer the plea 
agreement,” and, assuming that Cooper accepted the offer, “the state trial 
court c[ould] then exercise its discretion in determining whether to vacate 
the convictions and resentence [Cooper] pursuant to the plea agreement, to 
vacate only some of the convictions and resentence [Cooper] accordingly, 
or to leave the convictions and sentence from trial undisturbed.”16 
Thus, the Lafler Court simultaneously proclaimed that the defendant’s 
receipt of deficient counsel during the plea bargaining phase was 
unconstitutional, while creating a sentencing remedy that was, in effect, 
optional.17  Trial courts, in crafting remedial sentences after a finding of a 
Lafler violation, have discretion to decline to remedy the ineffective 
assistance at all, and may instead refuse to vacate the trial’s convictions and 
sentence18—which would not have existed had the defendant had effective 
counsel and thus accepted the pretrial plea bargain to begin with. 
This Essay argues that the Lafler Court should have instead chosen the 
remedy of specific performance of the original plea bargain.  The specific 
performance remedy, long implemented by federal courts in Lafler-like 
scenarios,19 and ordered by the district court in Lafler,20 precisely cures the 
Lafler injury—the accused regains the ability to accept the original plea 
 
 11  Id.  
 12  Id.  
 13  Id. at 1384. 
 14  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
 15  Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1390. 
 16  Id. at 1391 (citation omitted).  
 17  See id.  
 18  See id.  
 19  See, e.g., United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1469 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding 
that if successful, a defendant bringing an ineffective assistance claim arising from an 
undisclosed plea offer should have the choice to accept the original plea offer); 
Lewandowski v. Makel, 949 F.2d 884, 885–87 (6th Cir. 1991) (granting the specific 
performance remedy to a defendant whose counsel withheld a plea offer); Satterlee v. 
Wolfenbarger, 374 F. Supp. 2d 562, 569 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (finding a grant of habeas 
corpus writ conditioned upon the State allowing a defendant to plead guilty to a lesser 
offense the appropriate remedy); see also infra note 116 and accompanying text.   
 20  Cooper v. Lafler, No. 06-11068, 2009 WL 817712, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 26, 
2009), aff’d, 376 F. App’x 563 (6th Cir. 2010), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).   
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offer, except he now has the benefit of effective assistance of counsel.  The 
specific performance remedy, when coupled with the safeguards of the 
Strickland prongs,21 poses little risk of abuse, and gives heft to the Sixth 
Amendment’s guarantee of effective assistance of counsel in the plea 
bargaining context.  If the Court gives constitutional weight to a Lafler 
violation, it should prescribe an equally weighty remedy. 
I.     LAFLER’S REMEDY IN THE LOWER COURTS 
Because the Supreme Court left intact the trial court’s discretion in 
resentencing after a successful Lafler claim—indeed, the trial court may 
reject outright a reoffered plea22—Lafler remedies are inherently 
nonuniform: trial courts across the country can wield their remedial 
discretion in various ways.  This Part divides Lafler claim trial court 
resolutions into four categories23: (1) those in which the trial court accepts 
the reoffered plea deal and sentences the defendant accordingly; (2) those 
in which the trial court accepts the reoffered plea deal and gives the 
defendant a sentencing penalty; (3) those in which the trial court orders the 
plea deal reoffered and subsequently rejects it, leaving the conviction and 
sentence undisturbed; and (4) those in which the parties come to an 
alternative remedy, similar to a civil settlement.  This Part offers a 
representative case for each category. 
A.   The Trial Court Accepts the Reoffered Plea Deal and Sentences the 
Defendant Accordingly 
In this category of case, a defendant has (1) been counseled to reject a 
favorable plea deal; (2) been subsequently convicted at trial, typically 
either on more severe charges than in the plea deal or to a longer sentence 
than in the plea deal; (3) then filed a Lafler claim; and (4) prevailed.  The 
court has then ordered the prosecutor to reoffer the original plea deal on the 
grounds that the advice to reject the plea deal constituted ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  After the defendant has accepted the reoffered plea 
deal, the court sentences in accordance with the deal. 
Take, for instance, Soto-Lopez v. United States.24  Carlos Soto-
Lopez,25 an alien, was deported and then illegally reentered the country.26  
 
 21  See infra notes 119–24 and accompanying text.   
 22  See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1389 (“[T]he judge can then exercise discretion in 
deciding whether to vacate the conviction from trial and accept the plea or leave the 
conviction undisturbed.”).   
 23  Of course, other categories could exist, such as those cases in which a defendant 
rejects a reoffered plea deal after a successful Lafler claim.  However, no such cases were 
found.   
 24  Soto-Lopez v. United States (Soto-Lopez III), No. 3:07-cr-3475, 2012 WL 3134253 
(S.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2012).  The case has multiple dispositions and docket numbers due to, 
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After being arrested by local police on a domestic assault matter, customs 
agents learned of his reentry, and the federal government initiated criminal 
charges.27  Federal prosecutors offered Soto-Lopez a “fast-track plea deal” 
that would “require [him] to waive indictment and enter a guilty plea” in 
exchange for “a ‘charge bargain,’ meaning he would plead guilty to an 
information charging him with three counts of illegal entry”—instead of a 
charge of being a deported alien found in the United States—and the 
Government “would recommend . . . a sentence of no greater than 48 
months.”28  The court-appointed defense counsel in the case advised Soto-
Lopez “that she believed the 48-month deal was the best offer the 
Government would give him and that if he did not accept this offer, he 
would face higher penalties.”29  Thus, Soto-Lopez “agreed to accept the 
fast track plea offer.”30 
However, Soto-Lopez soon thereafter heard from another inmate that 
another attorney could get him another deal.31  He met with this second 
attorney, who told him “that he was agreeing to a lot of time in custody” 
and that the attorney could get him “a 24-month offer or at most a 30-
month offer from the Government,” despite Soto-Lopez’s prior state court 
conviction, which the attorney said “would not count in federal court.”32  
Subsequently, Soto-Lopez dismissed his first attorney in favor of the 
second and quickly rejected the fast-track plea offer.33  This led the 
Government to dismiss the charges of illegal entry and indict Soto-Lopez 
on a “single count of being a deported alien found in the United States,” a 
more serious offense.34 
What Soto-Lopez did not know, however, was that the second 
attorney had just been suspended from the practice of law for, inter alia, 
“making false statements, and conduct that ‘plac[ed his] financial 
motivations above the interests of his client and expos[ed] his client to 
prejudice and delay.’”35  Although the attorney was required to inform his 
 
inter alia, appeals and the subsequent Lafler claim.  This citation is to the ultimate Order 
disposing of the Lafler claim.   
 25  Also known as Carlos Mendoza-Camacho.  See Complaint at 2, United States v. 
Mendoza-Camacho, No. 3:07-cr-3119 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2007), ECF No. 1.   
 26  Soto-Lopez III, 2012 WL 3134253, at *2.   
 27  Complaint, supra note 25, at 2.   
 28  Soto-Lopez III, 2012 WL 3134253, at *1.   
 29   Id. 
 30  Id.   
 31  Id.   
 32  Id.   
 33  Id. at *2.   
 34  Id.  Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2012) (illegal entry), with id. § 1326(a)–(b) 
(deported alien found in the United States).   
 35  United States v. Soto-Lopez (Soto-Lopez II), 475 F. App’x 144, 146 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(alterations in original) (citation omitted).   
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clients of this suspension, he never informed Soto-Lopez, and instead 
withdrew as the attorney of record.36 
Soto-Lopez eventually pled guilty to the higher charge without a plea 
agreement.37  At sentencing, the government recommended that Soto-
Lopez be sentenced to seventy-seven months, and the court so sentenced.38 
Subsequently, in 2010,39 Soto-Lopez filed an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim, alleging that he stood “prepared to accept the fast-track plea 
deal” until the second attorney “promised he could obtain a 24 or 30-month 
deal from the government,” and that this attorney “knew or should have 
known there was no chance the Government would make such an offer,” 
but made the promise in order to “fleece [Soto-Lopez] out of a fee.”40 
Citing the proposition that “uncertainty is inherent in predicting court 
decisions,” and that counsel must only “give the defendant the tools he 
needs to make an intelligent decision,”41 the district court denied Soto-
Lopez’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, stating that he indeed “had 
the tools he needed to make an informed decision.”42  The district court 
elaborated, stating that although “[h]indsight demonstrates [the second 
attorney’s] prediction—that he could get [Soto-Lopez] a better deal—was 
inaccurate,” there was no evidence that the second attorney “made any 
affirmative misrepresentations of law or fact or that he interfered with 
[Soto-Lopez’s] previous understanding of the potential consequences of 
failing to obtain a new plea deal.”43 
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Lafler, the Ninth Circuit 
reversed the district court’s denial of Soto-Lopez’s ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim.44  Detailing the second attorney’s misconduct, the Ninth 
Circuit found that the second attorney met both prongs of the Strickland 
test, stating: 
When the serious doubts about [the second attorney’s] professionalism 
and honesty occasioned by his contemporaneous conduct are combined 
with the facts of his representation of Soto-Lopez, the record supports 
Soto-Lopez’s claim that [the second attorney] provided him ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
 
 36  Soto-Lopez v. United States (Soto-Lopez I), No. 07-cr-3475, 2011 WL 176026, at 
*1 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2011), rev’d, 475 F. App’x 144 (9th Cir. 2012).   
 37  Soto-Lopez III, 2012 WL 3134253, at *2.   
 38  Id. at *3.   
 39  The district court rendered judgment on the claim in 2011, more than a year before 
Lafler was decided.   
 40  Soto-Lopez I, 2011 WL 176026, at *3 (citations omitted).   
 41  Id. at *4 (quoting Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 881 (9th Cir. 2002)).   
 42  Id.   
 43  Id.   
 44  United States v. Soto-Lopez (Soto-Lopez II), 475 F. App’x 144, 148 (9th Cir. 
2012).   
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. . . .  
[Likewise,] Soto-Lopez has alleged sufficient facts to show 
prejudice . . . . If Soto-Lopez had not abruptly changed course once he 
encountered [the second attorney], he would then have received the 
benefit of the 48-month plea offer, and in any event could have received 
no more than the statutory maximum of 54 months for the three counts 
of illegal entry.45 
The Ninth Circuit remanded the case, instructing the district court to 
conduct an evidentiary hearing on the matter.46 
On remand, the district court found that the second attorney’s “advice 
and representations were not based on any sincere trial strategy,” and, in 
fact, the attorney “appears to have had no basis at all for giving that advice 
and making those representations.”47  Accordingly, the court ordered the 
government to “reoffer the original 48-month fast track plea agreement.”48  
The government did so, and Soto-Lopez accepted the plea agreement.49  
The court sentenced Soto-Lopez to forty-eight months time served.50 
Soto-Lopez surely stands as an example for what Lafler remedies 
“ideally” look like.  The defendant rejected a favorable plea offer based on 
unconstitutionally deficient advice, and paid the price in the form of a 
thirty-three-month sentencing penalty.  Applying Lafler, the court ordered 
the government to reoffer the favorable plea deal, and thereafter sentenced 
the defendant accordingly.  The parties received what they originally 
bargained for: a forty-eight-month sentence.  This remedy adequately 
protected Soto-Lopez’s Sixth Amendment right: had he received 
constitutionally adequate representation from the start, he would have 
received a forty-eight-month sentence.  Thus, the remedy for deficient 
representation also led to a forty-eight-month sentence.  However, such a 
straightforward and just application of Lafler’s remedy does not always 
occur. 
 
 45  Id. at 147.   
 46  Id. at 147–48.   
 47  Soto-Lopez v. United States (Soto-Lopez III), No. 3:07-cr-3475, 2012 WL 
3134253, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2012).   
 48  Id. at *8.   
 49  See Superseding Information, Soto-Lopez III, 2012 WL 3134253 (No. 3:07-cr-
3475), ECF No. 72; Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case, Soto-Lopez III, 2012 WL 
3134253 (No. 3:07-cr-3475), ECF No. 76. 
 50  See Minute Entry of Aug. 6, 2012, Soto-Lopez III, 2012 WL 3134253 (No. 3:07-cr-
3475), ECF No. 74; Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case, supra note 49.   
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B.   The Trial Court Accepts the Reoffered Plea Deal and Gives the 
Defendant a Sentencing Penalty 
The second category of cases are those in which the defendant makes 
a successful Lafler claim, as in the first category, but the court in 
resentencing imposes a sentence higher than in the plea deal.  Under Lafler, 
the trial court has the discretion to resentence the defendant in this manner, 
just as the court would have under normal circumstances.51   
 Lafler itself is representative of this category of cases.  In Lafler, defendant 
Anthony Cooper shot a victim repeatedly below the waist.52  Faced with 
charges of “assault with intent to murder, possession of a firearm by a 
felon, possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony, misdemeanor 
possession of marijuana, and for being a habitual offender,” Cooper’s 
sentence, if he were to be found guilty on all counts, would be a mandatory 
minimum of 185 to 360 months, or 15 to 30 years.53 
The prosecution in the case twice offered Cooper a plea deal in which 
he would plead guilty to two of the charges, the others would be dropped, 
and the State would recommend a sentence of 51 to 85 months, or 4 to 7 
years.54  However, Cooper’s attorney advised him to reject this favorable 
deal, allegedly stating that “the prosecution would be unable to establish 
[Cooper’s] intent to murder [the victim] because she had been shot below 
the waist.”55  The attorney, McClain, went so far as to lambast the plea 
offer in front of the State: 
[A] week before trial was to begin, the prosecution provided petitioner 
and his counsel a written plea agreement of 51 to 85 months.  McClain 
indicated on the record that the prosecutor’s offered deal was “not 
reasonable,” that there “is insufficient evidence” and that the 
“Prosecution does not have the evidence to try to [sic] this case.”  The 
prosecutor, offended by McClain’s comment that the offer was 
unreasonable, then stated “I withdraw this offer.”  Undeterred, McClain 
then said, “We’re just rejecting the offer.”  Petitioner, who was present 
at the conference, was reading the plea offer he had just received.  He 
was not asked about the plea agreement, and did not offer any comment 
on it.56   
Cooper stood trial on all charges, was convicted on all counts, and was 
sentenced to 185 to 360 months, or 15 to 30 years.57 
 
 51  See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1391 (2012).   
 52  Id. at 1383.   
 53  Id.   
 54  Id.   
 55  Id.   
 56  Cooper v. Lafler, 376 F. App’x 563, 566 (6th Cir. 2010), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1376 
(2012) (second alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (internal citations omitted).   
 57  Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1383.   
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Cooper raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, which the 
trial court rejected.58  The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning 
that “the record shows that defendant knowingly and intelligently rejected 
two plea offers and chose to go to trial.”59  After the Michigan Supreme 
Court denied Cooper’s motion for leave to file an appeal,60 Cooper was 
conditionally granted a writ of habeas corpus, as the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan found that defense counsel had 
acted unreasonably.61  The Sixth Circuit affirmed,62 and the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari, requesting briefing on the question of remedy.63 
Agreeing that Cooper’s attorney provided unconstitutionally deficient 
counsel, and deciding to fashion its own remedy, the Supreme Court 
vacated the judgments below and remanded the case.64  The Court ordered 
“the State to reoffer the plea agreement,” and provided: “[T]he state trial 
court can then exercise its discretion in determining whether to vacate the 
convictions and resentence respondent pursuant to the plea agreement, to 
vacate only some of the convictions and resentence respondent 
accordingly, or to leave the convictions and sentence from trial 
undisturbed.”65 
On remand, the State reoffered the original plea agreement, and 
moved to dismiss all but two of Cooper’s charges.66  Although the State 
originally agreed to recommend a sentence of 51 to 85 months, or 4 to 7 
years, and presumably did so on remand, the trial court did not so 
 
 58  See People v. Cooper, No. 250583, 2005 WL 599740, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 
15, 2005) (per curiam) (“Defendant challenges the trial court’s finding after a . . . hearing 
that defense counsel provided effective assistance to defendant during the plea bargaining 
process.”).   
 59  Id.   
 60  See People v. Cooper, 705 N.W.2d 118 (Mich. 2005).   
 61  Cooper v. Lafler, No. 06-11068, 2009 WL 817712, at *8–9 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 26, 
2009), aff’d, 376 F. App’x 563 (6th Cir. 2010), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).   
 62  Cooper v. Lafler, 376 F. App’x 563 (6th Cir. 2010), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1376.   
 63  Lafler v. Cooper, 131 S. Ct. 856 (2011) (mem.) (granting certiorari) (“In addition 
to the question presented by the petition the parties are directed to brief and argue the 
following question: ‘What remedy, if any, should be provided for ineffective assistance of 
counsel during plea bargain negotiations if the defendant was later convicted and sentenced 
pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures?’”).   
 64  Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1391.   
 65  Id.   
 66  See Register of Actions for Case No. 03-004617-01-FC, THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 
OF MICH.: ODYSSEY WEB ACCESS, https://www.3rdcc.org/OPA.aspx (last visited Apr. 13, 
2017) (follow “Criminal Case Records,” then search for “Cooper, Anthony,” then select 
“Case No. 03-004617-01-FC”).   
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sentence.67  Instead, the court resentenced Cooper to 60 to 130 months, or 5 
to 11 years.68 
Although this plea deal resulted in a significantly lighter sentence than 
Cooper’s original fifteen to thirty years, it is still longer than the sentence 
for which the parties had originally bargained.  Of course, we do not and 
cannot know what sentence the trial court would have imposed had the plea 
deal been accepted at the outset.  Perhaps Cooper would have received this 
sentence either way—at the outset or after the ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim.  However, it is also possible that the trial court added 
additional months or years to Cooper’s sentence to “punish” him for almost 
ten years of post-sentencing litigation.69 
C.   The Trial Court Orders the Plea Deal Reoffered and Subsequently 
Rejects It, Leaving the Conviction and Sentence Undisturbed 
The third category of cases are those in which the defendant makes a 
successful Lafler claim, as in the first two categories, but the court leaves 
the convictions and sentence imposed at trial intact even after the original 
plea deal is reoffered and signed by both parties.  The Lafler court appears 
to have left this option open to trial courts, stating that after a successful 
Lafler claim, the trial court has discretion to “leave the convictions and 
sentence from trial undisturbed.”70  It is not readily apparent that any 
 
 67  Id.   
 68  Id.   
 69  Of course, a trial judge would never attribute the enhanced penalty to this 
motivation, as it would be an unconstitutional violation of the defendant’s due process.  See 
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969), overruled in part by Alabama v. Smith, 
490 U.S. 794 (1989) (“Due process of law . . . requires that vindictiveness against a 
defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the 
sentence he receives after a new trial . . . . [D]ue process also requires that a defendant be 
freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge.”).  
However, a trial judge may constitutionally give a harsher sentence in our scenario if he has 
determined such a sentence is warranted “in the light of events subsequent to the first trial 
that may have thrown new light upon the defendant’s ‘life, health, habits, conduct, and 
mental and moral propensities.’”  Id. at 723 (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 
245 (1949)); see Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1389 (“[A] judge is [not] required to prescind (that is 
to say disregard) any information concerning the crime that was discovered after the plea 
offer was made.  The time continuum makes it difficult to restore the defendant and the 
prosecution to the precise positions they occupied prior to the rejection of the plea 
offer . . . .”).  Further, the Pearce presumption of vindictiveness does not apply when “a 
second sentence imposed after a trial is heavier than a first sentence imposed after a guilty 
plea.”  Smith, 490 U.S. at 803.  In short, it is entirely possible that trial judges add this 
sentencing penalty without explicitly calling it that.  See also Stephanos Bibas, Incompetent 
Plea Bargaining and Extrajudicial Reforms, 126 HARV. L. REV. 150, 163 (2012) (“[J]udges 
are unlikely to err on the side of leniency . . . . Judges may take into account the substantial 
resources that courts and prosecutors have had to expend to try a case . . . .”).   
 70  Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1391 (citation omitted).   
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district court has utilized this option in the four years since Lafler.  
However, one district court did appear to at least contemplate this option. 
In Lespier v. United States, defendant James Lespier shot his child’s 
mother in the back of the head, killing her.71  Upon police officers’ arrival 
at the scene, Lespier was covered in blood and hysterical.72  An array of 
physical evidence pointed to Lespier’s culpability in the crime.73  As this 
occurred on a Cherokee Indian reservation, Lespier was indicted in federal 
court on charges of second-degree murder and the use of a firearm during a 
crime of violence.74 
Having been assigned a federal public defender, Lespier signed a plea 
agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty to second-degree murder and 
the government agreed to dismiss the gun charge.75  Subsequently, 
however, Lespier retained private counsel, Mr. McLean.76  After hearing 
the facts of the case, attorney McLean advised defendant Lespier and his 
family 
that “he could win the case,” and . . . “They ain’t got nothing on him.”  
Mr. McLean further opined that “there was no way the prosecution 
could convict [the Petitioner] of murder,” as the prosecution could not 
prove that the Petitioner had even fired the gun.  Finally, Mr. McLean 
opined . . . that the Petitioner “should not plead guilty to second degree 
murder as he intended in his plea agreement.”77 
McLean further advised the defendant’s family that the federal public 
defender “had lied” and that McLean would be “bringing [their] boy 
home.”78  Additionally, McLean told Lespier that he would “likely serve a 
full 18 years” if he took the plea deal, but if he went to trial, “there was ‘no 
way’ the Government could convict him for second-degree murder.”79  
Thereafter, Lespier withdrew his agreement to the plea proposal.80 
The Government sought and received a superseding indictment on 
first-degree murder and the gun charge; significantly, however, “the 
Government’s previous plea offer of a plea to second-degree murder and 
dismissal of the [gun charge] count remained on the table and was never 
rescinded.”81  At trial, the jury found Lespier guilty of first-degree murder 
 
 71  No. 2:10-cr-9, 2016 WL 3406247, at *1 (W.D.N.C. June 17, 2016).   
 72  Id.   
 73  See id. at *1–2.   
 74  Id. at *2 (noting federal jurisdiction for crimes in Indian territory).    
 75  Id.   
 76  Id.   
 77  Id. at *4 (second alteration in original) (citations omitted).   
 78  Id. (citation omitted). 
 79  Id. at *5 (citation omitted).  
 80  Id. at *3.   
 81  Id. (citation omitted). 
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and the gun charge, and the court sentenced him to two consecutive life 
sentences.82 
Lespier filed a Lafler claim, alleging that McLean provided ineffective 
assistance of counsel in advising him to reject the second-degree murder 
plea agreement.83  Citing the fact that Lespier had “made a critical 
decision—the withdrawal of his assent to an executed Plea Agreement—
based on advice that was given without meaningful investigation or study 
of the evidence or of the applicable Guidelines,” the court found that “the 
accumulation of counsel’s errors resulted in [Lespier] receiving assistance 
that was clearly deficient.”84  Thus—as the district court also found that it 
was reasonably likely that the plea agreement would have remained 
available and would have been accepted by the district court—Lespier 
made a successful Lafler showing.85 
The court accordingly ordered the Government to reoffer the original 
plea agreement of second-degree murder and drop the gun charge.86  The 
Government did so, and Lespier accepted the plea deal.87  Interestingly, 
however, the judge appears to have contemplated an approach outside of 
the first two categories of cases: he ordered briefing on “whether or not the 
Court should leave the defendant’s sentence undisturbed or, now that the 
defendant has pled guilty to second degree murder pursuant to the original 
plea arrangement[,] which the Court required the government to re-offer, 
should proceed to a sentencing hearing.”88 
The Government’s brief highlighted the court’s “right to reject plea 
proposals” and also asserted that the Government had the right to rescind 
the plea offer if Lespier did not “acknowledg[e] his guilt to second-degree 
murder.”89  Since Lespier already had done so, the Government declined to 
withdraw its plea proposal.90  The government expressly claimed, however, 
that the court “still reserves the right to reject a plea agreement, for 
example, if it deems the agreement to be too lenient, or if a defendant fails 
 
 82  Id.   
 83  Id. at *8.   
 84  Id. at *11.   
 85  Id. at *12.   
 86  Id. at *14.   
 87  See Rule 11 Inquiry and Order Accepting Guilty Plea, Lespier, 2016 WL 3406247 
(No. 2:10-cr-9), ECF No. 147.  
 88  Lespier’s Memorandum Regarding Lafler Discretion at 1, Lespier, 2016 WL 
3406247 (No. 2:10-cr-9), ECF No. 151.  The Government characterized the briefing order 
as a “request for briefing regarding whether or not the Court has the discretion to leave the 
Defendant’s sentence undisturbed.”  Government’s Memorandum Regarding Lafler 
Discretion at 1, Lespier, 2016 WL 3406247 (No. 2:10-cr-9), ECF No. 149.  The order for 
briefing is sealed and thus unavailable.  See Minute Entry for Document No. 148, Lespier, 
2016 WL 3406247 (No. 2:10-cr-9). 
 89  Government’s Memorandum, supra note 88, at 3.   
 90  Id.   
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to admit his guilt.”91  Notably, the Government’s brief did not advocate for 
the judge to retain the post-trial sentence.92 
Lespier’s brief first noted that “the [G]overnment has given no reason 
why this court should reject the plea agreement.”93  In a nod to the novelty 
of the situation, the brief went on to state: 
The defendant is unaware of any post-Lafler cases that suggest the 
circumstances wherein a court should refuse to vacate the conviction 
after the defendant has accepted the plea agreement that the court had 
ordered to be offered again.  If any such circumstances exist in some 
other case, they certainly do not exist in the context of this case.94 
Lespier further noted that there was no reason to believe that the court 
“would have rejected the plea agreement if the defendant had continued 
with his guilty plea as initially filed,” and that the court likely would have 
accepted the plea.95 
The trial court, in the end, accepted Lespier’s plea and sentenced him 
to 348 months.96  However, the judge’s apparent contemplation of letting 
the original sentence of two consecutive life sentences stand shows the real 
possibility of a Lafler category three case.  Although Lespier pled guilty to 
second-degree murder, and despite the fact that the Government expressly 
had not advocated for such a harsh remedy, the court here could have left 
his conviction and sentence for first-degree murder intact.  This scenario 
was, of course, contemplated by the Supreme Court in Lafler,97 but seems 
to be rarely, if ever, faced.  This is likely due to the fact that, at this stage in 
the litigation, the court has already found that the defendant was given the 
unconstitutionally deficient advice to reject a generous plea offer, and 
instead unwisely chose to stand trial.  Reinstating the harsh penalty 
imposed after such a trial likely does not sit well with many trial court 
judges.  However, the mere fact that this purported remedy remains a 
possibility after such a finding of unconstitutionally deficient advice 
highlights the issue with making a constitutional remedy in effect optional. 
 
 91  Id.   
 92  Id.   
 93  Lespier’s Memorandum, supra note 88, at 1–2.   
 94  Id. at 2.   
 95  Id. at 2–3 (citing Lespier v. United States, No. 2:10-cr-9, 2016 WL 3406247, at *12 
(W.D.N.C. June 17, 2016)).   
 96  Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case at 1–2, Lespier, 2016 WL 3406247 (No. 
2:10-cr-9), ECF No. 160.   
 97  See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1391 (2012) (stating that a trial court may 
“leave the convictions and sentence from trial undisturbed”).   
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D.   The Parties Come to an Alternative Remedy 
A fourth category of cases feature the parties coming to an alternative 
arrangement.  The parties presumably do this to avoid prolonging litigation, 
to avoid uncertainty, and to find a “middle ground” sentence that will be 
acceptable to both parties. 
For example, in McNeill v. United States, DEA agents found “more 
than one kilogram of heroin, in addition to approximately 2,800 glassine 
envelopes containing heroin, a loaded 9mm Smith and Wesson handgun 
with an obliterated serial number and ammunition” in defendant McNeill’s 
motel room and “a loaded Walther PPK .380 caliber handgun, bearing an 
obliterated serial number, [and] approximately ten glassine envelopes 
containing an off-white powdered substance” in a car used by McNeill.98 
The Government made McNeill a plea offer consisting of gun and 
drug charges carrying a minimum of ten years.99  McNeill rejected this 
offer, and proceeded to trial.100  McNeill was convicted and received a 
sentence of forty years.101  The trial court found that McNeill’s counsel’s 
advice regarding the rejection of the plea offer had been both deficient and 
prejudicial, therefore meeting both of Strickland’s prongs.102 
After this finding, the trial court ordered that the Government reoffer 
the ten-year plea agreement.103  The Government appealed this order to the 
Third Circuit.104  However, soon thereafter, the Government and defendant 
McNeill came to an agreement in which the Government would drop its 
appeal and would dismiss one of the gun charges that carried a twenty-five-
year mandatory minimum.105  In exchange, McNeill would accept the 
remainder of his sentence as it stood.106  Because this twenty-five-year gun 
charge had run consecutively to the remainder of McNeill’s sentences, this 
agreement effectively reduced his sentence from forty years to fifteen 
years.107 
Because McNeill’s litigation had run for over twelve years, the 
parties’ eagerness to avoid continuing the case is understandable.  Instead 
 
 98  United States v. McNeill, No. 04-514, 2006 WL 2000519, at *1 (D.N.J. July 17, 
2006) (citations omitted).   
 99  McNeill v. United States, No. 09-5983, 2016 WL 830764, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 3, 
2016). 
 100  Id. at *8–9.   
 101  Id.   
 102  Id.   
 103  Id. at *9.   
 104  See Notice of Appeal, McNeill, 2016 WL 830764 (No. 09-5983), ECF No. 64.   
 105  Consent Order to Correct Sentence and Amend Judgment of Conviction, McNeill, 
2016 WL 830764 (No. 09-5983), ECF No. 66. 
 106  Id.   
 107  See Judgment in a Criminal Case at 2, United States v. McNeill, No. 04-514, 2006 
WL 2000519 (D.N.J. July 17, 2006), ECF No. 61. 
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of litigating the merits of McNeill’s Lafler claim and the district court’s 
remedy, the Government and McNeill seem to have agreed on a bargain: 
McNeill received a sentence that was five years longer than the one he had 
originally been offered.  This settlement outside of court also had the 
advantage of certainty: due to Lafler’s allowance for nearly unbridled 
discretion in the district court, had the Government lost its appeal and been 
forced to reoffer the ten-year plea, neither side would have known what 
sentence the district court would have handed down, or if the district court 
would have imposed a category three solution and declined to accept the 
plea bargain.  A civil litigation-style settlement avoided this uncertainty for 
both parties. 
II.     WHAT WOULD BE A BETTER REMEDY? 
As shown by the above four categories, Lafler, by its terms, allows for 
a wide variety of remedies for the same constitutional violation.  The 
Supreme Court described the trial court’s remedial discretion in one 
sentence: “[T]he judge can . . . exercise discretion in deciding whether to 
vacate the conviction from trial and accept the plea or leave the conviction 
undisturbed.”108  Noting that “[p]rinciples elaborated over time in decisions 
of state and federal courts, and in statutes and rules, will serve to give more 
complete guidance as to the factors that should bear upon the exercise of 
the judge’s discretion,” the Court outlined only two factors serving to limit 
a trial judge’s discretion: 
First, a court may take account of a defendant’s earlier expressed 
willingness, or unwillingness, to accept responsibility for his or her 
actions.  Second, it is not necessary here to decide as a constitutional 
rule that a judge is required to prescind (that is to say disregard) any 
information concerning the crime that was discovered after the plea 
offer was made.  The time continuum makes it difficult to restore the 
defendant and the prosecution to the precise positions they occupied 
prior to the rejection of the plea offer, but that baseline can be consulted 
in finding a remedy that does not require the prosecution to incur the 
expense of conducting a new trial.109 
As illustrated by the preceding Part, this vast discretion leads to 
incongruent results, and, in the extreme category three case, can lead to a 
trial judge affirming a sentence obtained after an admittedly 
unconstitutional plea process—rendering moot the entire subsequent Lafler 
 
 108  Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1389 (2012).  The Court alternatively expressed 
this as follows: “[T]he state trial court can then exercise its discretion in determining 
whether to vacate the convictions and resentence respondent pursuant to the plea agreement, 
to vacate only some of the convictions and resentence respondent accordingly, or to leave 
the convictions and sentence from trial undisturbed.”  Id. at 1391 (citation omitted).   
 109  Id. at 1389.   
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litigation.  In so crafting a Sixth Amendment remedy replete with trial court 
discretion, the Supreme Court effectively failed to protect defendants’ 
Sixth Amendment rights. 
Justice Scalia, in dissent, clearly identified this issue.  In apparent 
amazement, he lamented the fact that the majority in Lafler created a 
“‘discretionary’ specification of a remedy for an unconstitutional criminal 
conviction.”110  Continuing, he wrote, “I find it extraordinary that ‘statutes 
and rules’ can specify the remedy for a criminal defendant’s 
unconstitutional conviction.  Or that the remedy for an unconstitutional 
conviction should ever be subject at all to a trial judge’s discretion.  Or, 
finally, that the remedy could ever include no remedy at all.”111 
This strangely discretionary112 remedy for a violation of constitutional 
proportions could be solved by curtailing a trial judge’s discretion by 
requiring specific performance of the original plea bargain.  This approach 
would offer a much stronger and more consistent remedy to properly 
safeguard the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.  However, the Supreme 
Court expressly and summarily rejected such a remedy in Lafler, as it was 
the one the district court employed.113 
The Lafler district court noted that in habeas cases that require as a 
remedy something less than a full retrial, “conditional writs must be 
tailored to ensure that all constitutional defects will be cured by the 
satisfaction of that condition.”114  The court further noted that “[c]ases 
involving deprivations of the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of 
 
 110  Id. at 1397 (Scalia, J., dissenting).   
 111  Id.  Of course, Justice Scalia did not think that the Lafler scenario prompted any 
constitutional violation at all, as “[t]he defendant has been fairly tried, lawfully convicted, 
and properly sentenced, and any ‘remedy’ provided for this will do nothing but undo the just 
results of a fair adversarial process.”  Id.   
 112  Compare, for example, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, which states that 
“all evidence obtained by an unconstitutional search and seizure [is] inadmissible in a . . . 
court regardless of its source.”  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654 (1961).  Although the 
Supreme Court subsequently weakened this rule by creating various exceptions to it, see, 
e.g., Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988) (independent source doctrine); Nix v. 
Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (inevitable discovery rule); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 
U.S. 471 (1963) (attenuation doctrine), these exceptions negate the application of the 
exclusionary rule itself.  They do not make the exclusionary rule’s remedy discretionary—
once a court determines that the exclusionary rule applies, it must exclude the tainted 
evidence.   
 113  See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1391 (“As a remedy, the District Court ordered specific 
performance of the original plea agreement.  The correct remedy in these circumstances, 
however, is to order the State to reoffer the plea agreement.”).   
 114  Cooper v. Lafler, No. 06-11068, 2009 WL 817712, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 26, 
2009), aff’d, 376 F. App’x 563 (6th Cir. 2010), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012) (citing 
Henderson v. Frank, 155 F.3d 159, 168 (3d Cir. 1998)).   
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counsel are likewise subject to the general rule that remedies should be 
tailored to the injury suffered from the constitutional violation.”115 
By requiring specific performance, the district court tailored a remedy 
that would have truly and exactly cured Cooper’s constitutional injury: he 
would have received the same plea agreement that he originally was 
offered.116  Clearly, this would have made no difference in Cooper’s 
specific case.  Even under the specific performance model, category two 
remedies—as in Lafler—could still exist.  The court still retains sentencing 
authority under a specific performance regime.  However, category three 
remedies, in which the court leaves the post-trial conviction and sentence 
intact, are all but banned with a specific performance remedy. 
However, the specific performance remedy has its detractors.  Some 
prosecutors, for instance, protest that a defendant, such as Cooper in Lafler, 
“will get to have his cake and eat it too—he got a shot at acquittal, then, 
that having failed he will get the original plea offer the prosecutor 
designed, at least in part, to avoid that contingency.”117  In essence, these 
prosecutors argue, after Lafler, “a defendant will be able to proceed to trial 
with the plea offer in his pocket, forcing specific performance when 
counsel’s advice to proceed turns out to be incorrect, as it must have 
been—he was, after all, convicted!”118 
Such a concern is misplaced, if not unfounded.  It does not properly 
take into account the first Strickland prong—the objective reasonableness 
test.  “The biggest hurdle” to such a concern coming to fruition, writes one 
commentator 
is simply that a convicted defendant must convince a court on post-
conviction review that his counsel’s performance was objectively 
unreasonable under Strickland v. Washington.  Strickland is a famously 
lax standard that succeeds for defendants in only a small minority of 
cases.  This was the intention of the Strickland Court, which stressed 
that the standard of objective reasonableness should be applied 
deferentially to defense counsel’s performance in order to avoid any 
hindsight bias.  Because Cooper’s prosecutors conceded that Cooper’s 
 
 115  Id. (citing United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981)). 
 116  Requiring specific performance of the foregone plea bargain in Lafler situations 
had been a remedy in several earlier federal cases.  The district court in Lafler cited three 
specific examples.  See id. (first citing United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458 (9th Cir. 
1994); then citing Lewandowski v. Makel, 949 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1991); and then citing 
Satterlee v. Wolfenbarger, 374 F. Supp. 2d 562 (E.D. Mich. 2005)).   
 117  Graham C. Polando, Being Honest About Chance: Mitigating Lafler v. Cooper’s 
Costs, 3 HOUSTON L. REV.: OFF THE RECORD 61, 64 (2013).   
 118  Id.   
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lawyer was ineffective, the Strickland performance analysis was not at 
issue in his case.  That will be true for few other defendants.119 
Thus, the stringent Strickland test—which was retained in and clarified by 
Lafler120—provides the ultimate safeguard to this type of concern.  Further, 
a defendant wishing to “play this game” would need to be willing to stand 
trial on whatever enhanced charges the prosecution brought to trial—for 
example, the first-degree murder charge added at trial in lieu of second-
degree murder in Lespier121—and risk, after a failed Lafler claim, living 
with the consequences of these enhanced charges.122 
Another barrier to abuse of the specific performance remedy is 
Strickland’s prejudice prong.  Defendants asserting a Lafler claim must 
show 
that but for the ineffective advice of counsel there is a reasonable 
probability that the plea offer would have been presented to the court 
(i.e., that the defendant would have accepted the plea and the 
prosecution would not have withdrawn it in light of intervening 
circumstances), that the court would have accepted its terms, and that 
the conviction or sentence, or both, under the offer’s terms would have 
been less severe than under the judgment and sentence that in fact were 
imposed.123 
This limitation provides a safeguard against abuse of the specific 
performance remedy without resorting to the unfettered discretion 
employed by the Supreme Court in Lafler.  One court expressed this 
safeguard in a Lafler-type scenario as allowing the government to “seek to 
demonstrate that intervening circumstances have so changed the factual 
premises of its original offer that, with just cause, it would have modified 
or withdrawn its offer prior to its expiration date.”124  Thus, through the 
Strickland prejudice analysis, the judicial system is further protected from 
manipulation by savvy defendants, as the government may make a showing 
that it would have retracted the plea offer if the facts so indicate—deterring 
and defeating any gamesmanship in the plea bargaining process. 
In sum, a specific performance remedy—coupled with the safeguard 
of Strickland’s two prongs125—would have been the most precise solution 
 
 119  Darryl K. Brown, Lafler’s Remedial Uncertainty: Why Prosecutors Can Rest Easy, 
3 HOUSTON L. REV.: OFF THE RECORD 9, 11 (2013) (footnotes omitted).   
 120  See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384–85 (2012) (applying Strickland); see 
also, e.g., In re Perez, 682 F.3d 930, 932–33 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (“Lafler and Frye 
are not new rules because they were dictated by Strickland.” (citation omitted)).   
 121  See Lespier v. United States, No. 2:10-cr-9, 2016 WL 3406247, at *3 (W.D.N.C. 
June 17, 2016).   
 122  See Brown, supra note 119, at 12.   
 123  Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1385.   
 124  United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1468–69 (9th Cir. 1994).   
 125  See supra notes 119–24 and accompanying text.   
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to the unconstitutionally deficient performance of counsel in Lafler 
situations.  The specific performance remedy squarely and fully addresses 
the constitutional violation.  By instead creating a malleable remedy with 
few, if any, parameters of when discretion is appropriate, the Supreme 
Court tacitly dismissed the importance of an accused’s Sixth Amendment 
right to the effective assistance of counsel during plea bargaining.  This has 
led to disparate and unequal application of the Lafler remedy in lower 
courts.  If the Supreme Court wishes to preserve the Lafler line of cases as 
constitutionally mandated, it should couple the violations with a strong 
specific performance remedy, thereby championing defendants’ Sixth 
Amendment rights.  Instead, the Court has allowed trial courts to disregard 




 126  See generally Lespier, 2016 WL 3406247.   
